Now many ofthe pseudonyms talk about ethics. This idea takes the characteristic form in their writings of a particular stage, or mode of existence: the "ethical". Can wc, then, at least begin by establishing a dear meaning for the idea of the ethical as a form of Iife?
Let us tum to the theory of the stages. 1 want to make a series of points about this theory. The first is that, strictly speaking, there is no one "theory of stages" in Kierkegaard. We have rather a number of different accounts of the stages by pseudonyms who are themselves represented as being at one stage or another. Admittedly these accounts show certain resemblances. They tend to agree in counting the aesthetic as the lowest stage, the ethical as the next stage, and the religious as the highest stage. They tend also to agree on the placing of intermediate activities.
Metaphysics goes between aesthetics and ethics in several books: the group consisting of poetry, psychology, and dialectics is placed between the ethical and the religious. The pseudonyms tend to connect irony with ethics and humour with religion, as also melancholy with aesthetics and resignation with ethics. But these resemblances are only formai -not necessarily structural -, and do not warrant identification of 39 __ _ one and the sa me theory in aIl pseudonyms. This question cannat be decided before we have carried out minute rhetorical analyses of each and every text. For formaI and superficiallikenesses of doctrine may well mask real differences which are embodied in Kierkegaard's literary techniques. As an example, the word "repetition" is often used in connection with the idea of the ethical. But, 1 daim, by itself this Îs insufficient to prove doctrinal overlap. For perhaps the word is being used in significantly different ways, and only linguistic analysis can tell us whether this is sa or not.
The second point about the "theory of stages" is that such a theory is nowhere presented objective/y. Since each pseudonym is himself at sorne stage, they can do no more than represent the stages as they appear from their own standpoints. Again, sorne appear to occupy roughly similar standpoints. For example, Repetition, Fear and Trembling, The Concept of Dread, the Fragments, and the Postscript are al! (whatever their differences) written from the complex stand point of the poetpsychologist-dialectician. Now it is central to the theory of stages that, put crudely. things look different to individuals at different stages. So too for the stages themselves. So the idea of the ethical, for example, will take different forms for the aesthete, the metaphysician, the ethical man, the psychologist, and the Christian. So too will specifie ethical ideas, like dut y or marriage. (In fact the idea of the ethical is plainly described in two quite different ways in the pseudonymous books. One group uses concepts like "universal", "repetition", "dut y" ; the other uses concepts like "individual", "subjective", and "passion". And although there are verbal overlaps, it is plain that we have to do with specimens respectively of Hegelian and Kantian ethics.)
The idea of a theory of stages came to Kierkegaard from Hegel's Phenomenology. It is axiomatic in Hegel that things look systematical!y different according to the thinker's mode of consciousness. But in Hegel there is also, beyond aIl particular and so distorting standpoints, an objective stand point. To the philosopher everything appears as it truly is. Kierkegaard foreeloses on this method of achieving objectivity, at least as regards forms of human practice, induding ethics. He does not merely think that no human being can occupy the standpoint of conscious eternity. It is rather that sorne aspects of human existence cannot be fully understood if understood as objective phenomena. Hegel's modes of consciousness and Kierkegaard's stages are simultaneously forms of theoretical reason and forms of practical reason. (Admittedly, we find in the Phenomenology what look like forms of pure theoretical reason, e.g., sense-certainty or scientific reason, and forms of pure practical reason, e.g., family life or romantic morality. But as Kojève has shown these are not actuaIly separable modes of thought or activity. For Hegel, the ide as of theory and practice are abstractions from a totality which is always necessarily both thought and practice). Now, according to Hegel forms of practice can be objectively understood, i.e., grasped theoretically, because they are implicitly themselves forms oftheory -or conversely because phiiosophical theory is itself the ultimate form of practice. Kierkegaard rejects any such assimilation. For him, modes of practice can be exhibited only in a human existence, not in a theory, and similariy can be grasped only through living and not merely through thinking.
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Contrasting Kierkegaard with Hegel, we might say that the stages can be pr.:sented "ror themselves" and "for each other", but not "in themsclves" and "Cor us": and not "in and for themselves", thal is, Phenomenologically. Yct therc is still an analogue in Kierkegaard for the Phenomenological standpoint. and it is the eomplex standpoint 1 mentioned earlier, which wc might cali "poetic psyehology" or "psychological poet ry". This is unique in relation tu the slages, sinee one who occupies il is able to grasp the stages as they appear to themselves while seeing them l'rom olltside, even lhough he ean grasp them only imaginatively and not praetically.
Kierkegaard's poet-psychologist, like Hegel's philosopher, is essentially a dialeetician. His dialectic resembles Hegel's in one crucial reature. In the Phenol11en%g~' \lié are shown how each mode of consciollsness embodies a finally incoherent set of concepts -an mconsistent picce of thenry and meta-theory. And wc are also shown how the incoherence of any conceptual scheme can be demonstrated l'rom wilhin itself. This is also true of the stages. The pseudonyms use their dialectic to create characlers (often themselves) who represent their stages 50 l'ully that they are on the edge of awareness of their own pending incoherence. Judge William's account of the ethical existence, for cxample, is so lucid that finally he l'uns up against the idea of the extraordinarius -an idea which is wholly inconsistent with the Judge's definition of ethics, and signais to the reader that this definition must be inadequate or incoherent.
[1' Kierkegaard's dialectic resembles Hegel's in this important way, it also differs in threc no less crucial ways. It is not objective, but psyehological: it is not systematic, sinee it is not theoretical : and, for the sa me reason, it is not historical. Hence there could not be a Kierkegaardian Phenomenology, It is crucial that poetry, psychology, and dialecties are not autonomous standpoints in the way Hegel's "philosophy" is. Anyone can have aIl or any of these powers. They do not form a stage by themselves; rather, we should see them as techniques of understanding and representation available at ail stages, So, where the Phenomen%gy contrasts particular modes of consciousness with the philosophical consciousness, Kierkegaard contrasts modes of consciousness with their own poeticizedpsyehologized forms. So wc still do not find in Kierkegaard a phenomenology whieh is, like Hegel's, extcrnal and th us objective,
Il
We might argue here that, although there is no externally objective standpoint in the pseudonymous works, still there is one in Kierkegaard's total corpus: namely the Christian standpoint. But there is a difficulty with this daim, In the acknowledged writings there is no discussion of the theory of stages or any important part of il. But if Kierkegaard had thought that Christianity provided a standpoint from which the theOl'y of stages could be objectively analysed and refuted, he would surely have do ne so in his acknowledged texts. So on the surface it looks as if Kierkegaard himself did not see Christianity as dialectically related ta the stages in the way speculative philosophy in Hegel is dialectically related to the earlier parts of the Phenomel1%gy.
l say more about this below. In anv case, although there is a sense in which for Kierkegaard only Christianity possesses "the truth", this is not a sense of truth wich IS in any way objective except in that it is authoritative.
Let us here consider the third point about the theory of stages; that it contains no kind of deduction of Christianity. Here again Kierkegaard's writings, even if phenomenological, are very un-Hegelian. For in Hegel the final stage of philosophy can of Ter an objective analysis of preeeding stages only in virtue of the faet that it derives itsclf dialectically from those earlier stages.
In the pseudonymous books wc find certain typical distinctions between the ethical and the religious, and certain typical ways of conneeting them. Let us identify some of the distinctions. In Fear and Tremblinfi Johannes de Silentio argues that faith is a paradox. He does not mean that what the believer believes is paradoxical, except in the weak sense of "contrary to eommon sense"; he means that the condition, or ground, of faith is a paradox. For, from his quasi-Hegelian standpoint, it is sc1f-contradictory that any individual should be related immediately ta God, and that this relationship should impose duties contrary to the duties of ethics. In the Fragments and Postscript Johannes Climacus argues that certain elements in what the Christian bclieves are paradoxical -in a rather different sense of paradox. This judgement, too, issues from an ethieal standpoint, although one that is quasi-Socratic. In The Concept of Dread Vigilius distinguishes two kinds of ethics, one based on metaphysies and the other on dogmatics and concerned with the concept of sin. Non-Christian ethics, according to Vigilius, cannot take account of this concept. To this list of distinctions wc might add Anti-Climacus' argument that Christ constitutes an "offence". Now what does such evidence show? It does not show that Kierkegaard himself thought Christian faith or ethics involved a "leap". It does nOl show that he thought Christian doctrine was self-contradictory. It does not show that the pseudonyms think Christianity as faith to be self-contradictory or as existence to be self-defeating. It shows only that, if one makes certain prior logical and ethical assumptions, one is debarred from adopting the Christian faith and embraeing the Christian ethics.
If these distinctions suggest that there is no deduction of'Christianity from the ethical in the pseudonymous texts, whether the deduction is modelled on Hegel or on Kant, there are also certain connections between ethics and religion which the pseudonyms make in ways suggesting that sorne deduction of Christianity might be possible after ail. For example, in the second volume of Eirher/Or Judge William argues that the aesthetic existence unfolds into an inevitable des pair which can be overcome only by an act of "absolute choice". This defines an ethical existence which is, however, in the J udge's eyes at the same time es~entially religious and indeed Christian. In the Fragments Johannes argues that there is a natural dialectic within human reason which !cads reason to a point where it collides with something essentially beyond reason. 1 use the expression "natural dialectic" to bring out the Kantian ancestry of this argument. Again, in The Sickness [lnto Death Anti-Climacus constructs a concept of the self one of whose implications is that true selfhood is gained and known only in faith.
Taking these typical pseudonymous positions together, the most wc can say in favour of a phenomenological deduction of Christianity from the ethical is this. If a man is poet, psychologist and dialectician, his renections on aesthetic and ethical existence may lead him ta a point where he finds himself forced to creale a "poem" about human existence that, at the same time, he finds both incredible and impracticable. This poem is recognisable as a version of parts of the Christian faith. But il is clear how far this is l'rom a deduction of Christianity, if we remember that these pseudonymous presentations of "Christianity" are (1) poetic, (2) paradoxieal, and (3) hypothetieal. For the believer. of course, Christianity is not poetic, not paradoxical, and not hypolhetical. It might be replied that, even if Kierkegaard's "phenomenology" contains no deduetion of Christianity, at leasl il offers a kind of deduction of an image of Christianity. But this reply is no use. For what is it that is supposed to occupy the final stage ') A poem which even as a hypothesis is a paradox. But this is no more genuine Christianity, or even religion, than a poetie image of the ethicallife is a kind of ethical existence. Genuine Christianity is a way oflife; a faith, and moreover one which understands; and a commitment. So what is "dedueed" in the pseudonymous works is not and cannot be Christianity.
III
These arguments show that Christianity does not function in the pseudonymous corpus as the philosophical standpoint functions in Hegel; as a stand point which is both internai to the dialectic and objective in relation to the preceding stages. But it might still be the case that the Christian standpoint functions in Kierkegaard's total corpus as a standard by which the stages, including the ethical life, can be assessed. This brings me to my fourth point about the stages: there is indeed an implicit Christian judgement on the stages, and this includes the judgements that these forms of existence are essentially sin{u/ and accompanied by essentially corrupt modes of consciousness. And these judgements apply equally to the ethical stage.
Now there is no single definition of the ethical in the pseudonymous corpus. Therc are a number of different partial indicators. These direct us towards three familiar kinds of ethical system: the Hegelian, the Kantian, and the PlatonicSocratic. These are ail ethics of will and the will's law, although each offers a peculiar analysis of these concepts. For Kierkegaard, the Christian judgement too must be based on a Christian concept of will and morallaw. This concept necessarily refers us to the concept of divine grace. It is here that ail "ethical" standpoints stumble and fall. For, l'rom Kierkegaard's Christian standpoint, the natural will is essentially corrupt. Kierkegaard remarks that this possibility never occurred to Socrates, and that it is indeed something that cannot be handled within a Socratic framework. However a historian might reply that it certainly occurred to both Kant and Hegel, and that each tried to handle it within his own ethical and metaphysical system. This raises extremely complex problems, and what l now say merely scratches their surface.
For both ethical systems, the crucial fact is that the operation of grace in human existence cannot be adequately acknowledged in either ethical system as an empirica/ reality. Consider Kant. In his Religion, we find a concept of radical evil. Kant uses this concept, inter alia, to distinguish two axes for the will: a weak-strong axis and a corrupt-holy axis. Since these are distinct, we have a typology of four modes of will : weak and corrupt (everyday), weak and holy (the saint), strong and corrupt (the demonic), and strong and holy (the angelic). Kant recognises that the problem of ethies cannot be solved by moving from weakness to strength of will. It requires movement also from corruption towards holiness. Yet in Kant's own terms this movement can be represented only as a postulate of reason, and one which must always remain un intelligible to our understanding and unachievable by our own unaided will-power. The very terms of his metaphysies make it meaningless to speak of grace as empirically real.
Again, in Hegei's system the corruption of the will is identified primarily as isolation of the particular will (spirit) from the Absolute Spirit. The will, perhaps, becomes holy insofar as it coincides with this Absolute Spirit. And it is Hegel's main objection to Kantianism that the latter made impossible this unification of the finite and infinite, a unification which is the he art of Hegel's whole philosophy. Now the finite will is reconciled practically with the infinite in fïnding its own substance in the objective forms of social existence; and it is reconciled theoretically with the infinite in finding its own creative subjectivity universalised in the successive absolute forms of art, religion, and philosophy. There is even an analogue in Hegel for the ide a of grace. It is the idea that Absolute Spirit is implicitly operative within ail finite modes of spirit, so that what a Christian calls the Divine Will is already implicitly at work in each human will. However, in Hegel ail these essential truths of Christian doctrine are re-presented in rational (dialectical) form ; and for this reason alone the Hegelian ethics is no less unsatisfactory to Kierkegaard than the Socratic and Kantian ethics. For Kierkegaard, the operation of divine grace, like everything characteristic of Chnstianity, is a matter of faith; experience, certainly, but the experience of the belicver alone. No dialectical argument for the operative reality of grace can reproduce the Christian's experience of its reality through his faith. Just as Kierkegaard says that God "exists" only for the beiiever, 50 grace can be experienced only by the believer. Now the experience of grace go es with another characteristic mark of Christianity: the experience of sin. Sin, too, cannot be experienced as real except by the Christian. That is, the essential corruption of the human will cannot exist as an ethical reality except within the Christian framework. So, Kierkegaard might have argued, a nonChristian ethics is not only unable to resolve the problem of the will's corruption, it is unable to present this as a real problem. Therefore the fact that both Kant and Hegel tried to solve this problem, however laudable, shows only that their basic metaphysical assumptions must be radically inconsistent with their ethical beliefs. A Christian ethics can no more be presented within a critical or speculative framework than it can be stated within the limits of Greek metaphysics. Now according to Kierkegaard corruption of the will implies corruption of the entire consciousness. This means that, from a Christian standpoint, the pseudonyms have a corrupt and false moral understanding. But they must also have a corrupt and false understanding of the ethical -of what ethics is, and what it means in the total universe of human existence. In the modern jargon, their meta-ethics too must be confused and inadequate. Among su ch confused meta-ethical beiiefs we might list the following familiar pseudonymous c1aims: (1) Judge William's c1aim that the "either/or" in human existence is a choice between the aesthetic and ethical existences; (2) his belief that the ethical is the highest stage of human existence, and includes a religious existence in itself; (3) the common belief that the ethical life is inconsistent with the practical demands of Christian faith ; and (4) the common belief that the cthieal cxistcnoe is solely or mainly a function of inwardness. 1 would say that thcse specimen pseudonymous beliefs are, from Kierkegaard's own standpoint, not only l'aise but conceptually corrupt in ways following from corresponding forms of the will's moral corruption.
We must remember here that the ethical is presented by pseudonyms. Now these pscudonyms arc creatures of poetry. This means that, unlike ordinary people, they can themselves be prescnted as consistent. Henee their meta-ethieal theorics, their cthical retleetions, and their actual existence can be, unlike ours, a consistent whole. So their understanding of the ethical may correspond perfectly on the Icvcl of th.eory \Vith their existence in practice. This is why corruption of consciousness can be exhibited in the pseudonymous works as a consequence of corruption of will.
However, even if there is a Christian judgement on the ethical existence, it is in no sense "objective". There are at least three reasons for this. First, according to Kierkegaard Christianity is essentially a matter of faith and, 1 would add, a gift of grace. Now the pseudonyms too sometimes say that Christianity is a matter of faith. But they mean that it is a paradox that cannot possibly be understood, but must be bclicved. For Kierkegaard himself, on the other hand, it means that although Christian doctrine can be understood, it can be understood only by one who believes iL This is not, however, "objective", since it lies beyond the limits of ail possible philosophical systems. Second, if the Christian stand point were objective, it would be capable of being set beside the other stand points in su ch a way as to permit comparative judgements of conceptual and existential adcquacy. But this is impossible: the pre-Christian and Christian positions are incommensurable. And third, although Kierkegaard insists with Anselm that Christian faith can be understood, it can he understood only from within. So the Christian judgement on existence can be intelligibly made only by one who is himse/f a Christian.
Hcre we can ask again: Why is Kierkegaard silent in his religious works about the cthical life and ail that goes with it? It is because the Christian judgcment is that the cthical is corrupt. But this judgement can be uttered only from a position of authority such as Kierkegaard never pretended to. He claimed only the kind of authority which allowcd him, as an individual, to speak out against Establishment Christianity. So, lacking the required form of religious authority, he could not say in public what he believed about public forms of life. And it is precise/y part of his attaek that those possessing such authority were not using it to speak out against the un-Christianness of Danish Christendom.
IV
Besides the idea of the ethical presented in the pseudonymous works, Kierkegaard also gives us under his own name a series of analyses of elemcnts of a Christian cthies. 1 do not want ta discuss this here, only to point out that it is totally distinct from any concept of the ethical we find in the pseudonyms. The two fundamental "ethical" duties we find stressed in the religious works are obedience to authority and charity. The Christian life itself is summarized in the categories of following, imitating, and witnessing. These ideas have no analogues in the ethical life; nor is any of them original ta Kierkegaard.
From the Christian standpoint the ethical existence has nothing "ethical" about il. 1 do not mean that Kierkegaard thought il impossible for an unbeliever to lead a life which is recognisably Christian. 1 am sure he allowed for grace and true virtue outside -or even inside -Christendom. Equally we should allow that an individual who is and who thinks of himself as leading an ethical life may in fact be living a ChrIStian life. A man can be a "knight of faith" without knowing it. 1 mean, rather, that the truly ethical life is grounded in the consciousness of sin and grace, and the reality of grace and faith, nothing of which can be present except per accidens in a non-Christian ethics.
We find, then, two absolutely different notions of ethics in Kierkegaard's corpus. One is a Christian ethics, upon which he reflects and discourses for a Christian audience. The other is a set of modern pagan ethical systems, presented by imaginary characters for an audience which, whether or not it believes itself to be Christian, is mistaken in its idea of Christianity. Kierkegaard himself assigns ethics to the category of edification. This is easy to apply to his religious writings, not so easy for the pseudonymous ones. About his acknowledged writings we can say the following. They are not meant to be edifying just in the sense of upbuilding their audience's understanding of Christian doctrine. They are aimed rather at the will, or conscience. Kierkegaard assumes that his audience understands more or less clearly what is required; and indeed it is not hard to understand. The difficulty, as Saint Paul said, is in the doing. However, we must add that where will or conscience is divided and unclear, there intellect will be unclear as weil. So ta sorne extent reflection may indirectly help to clarify the will. Nonetheless, the theoretical aim of these discourses is subordinate to their practical aim.
How precisely did Kierkegaard, writing as a Christian, mean his pseudonymous works ta be edifying? His own answer was that he wanted to show his contemporaries how ta become true Christians, instead of aesthetes or philosophers; and that he also wanted to show them how difficult this was. But this explanation is not really satisfactory. For by hypothesis the intended audience for the pseudonymous works is not Christian. SA the realities of the Christian experience and life could not be intelligible, and could not be made intelligible, to them. Then the idea of becoming a Christian could not be intelligible either ; and there is no dialectical path [rom natural reason ta faith. Further, there is nothing theoretical about becoming a Christian; there is no way (for Kierkegaard) of becoming a Christian except by the gift of faith. And that is free, not the reward of the individual's works. Shall we say, then, that Kierkegaard's pseudonymous works are a massive negative elenchus of the modern consciousness and existence? If sa, its audience might le am three things: [irst, that if they think they are Christians they are in alllikelihood mistaken ; second, that if they want to become Christians they cannot do so merely by leading lives which are 46 KIERKEGAARD'S CHRISTIAN JUDGE:vtENT ON E fHlCS ethical according to contemporary social and philosophical standards; and third, that in any case these modes of ethical existence make demands which cannot be naturally fulfilled, Even so, it is still not clear what Kierkegaard thought his pseudonymous work, could achieve, Remember that his most comistent judgement on his contemporanes was tha! they had lost passion and substituted for il a self-decciving retlection. "Edification" in this context must mean primarily the resto[ation of pa.l'.\iun to human existence. But how can this be done? The pseudonymous works, highly reflective themselves, arc aimed at their audience's powers of ref1ection. But, as Kierkegaard should have realised, they would mercly feed into this universal ref1eetivity. They would give people more to chatter about, more intcresting ways l)f avoiding action and eommitment. And surely this is preeisely what has happened to Kierkegaard? 1 suggest, moreover, that one reason why it has happened is that the pseudonyms themselves arc not merely refleetive personae, but chatterers. Kierkegaard's whole procedure, then, was highly risky, since if \vriting for an audience which tends to chatter, it must be risky to try to get them to see this and stop it by ofTering them a series of portraits of virtuoso chatterers. The risk is that the audience may be fascinated, not edified.
Suppose, speculatively, that passion is a constant clement of human being, present whether or not it is acknowledged. And suppose that des pair is a natural concomitant of certain forms of human existence, and is itself in fact one expression of passion. Then we may interpret the ret1ectivity which issues in illusion and selfdeceit as a natural human response to the pressure of despair, and so a distorted but still intelligible way in which passion is expressing itsclf. Now if an individu al in this condition can be got to reHect still more profoundly and acutely, he may be brought to awareness of his own des pair. At the same time, he will become partially awarc of the reasons why he has suppressed this despair, and aware that his ret1ectivity was a response to this suppression. Ali the while he is also becoming aware of the deep reasons why he has been in des pair. But this process must affect not only 11Is understanding but also his passion. For up to this point his passion has been, 50 to speak, thrown into the project of suppressing his despair in a substituted selfdelusion. And now it is partially freed from this project. Hence it can be utilised by the individual himself in a mode of existence which is not wholly and essentially despairing.
Now that paragraph contains a cru de account, l think, of the psychiatrie process; it also gives a crude account of something central to Kierkcgaard's thought and literary activity. And it is the only scheme of ideas which 1 can at present conccive to give sense to the ethical drive of his pseudonymous writings. Notice that in saying this l am assuming something about the idea of the ethical: namely, that selfunderstanding is central ta any ethical life, that no way of life can be counted ethical unless self-understanding constitutes a central and conscious aim for the individual. However, su ch a theory does not of course guarantee the success of Kierkegaard's religious enterprise, any more than it guarantees the success of any particular psychiatric process. In each case, succcss depends on a factor external to what is offercd the individual; the individual's own will to be cured.
